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ABSTRACT: Some solo verbal reasoning serves the function of arriving at a correct
answer to a question from information at the reasoner’s disposal. Such reasoning is
good if and only if its grounds are justified and adequate, its warrant is justified, and
the reasoner is justified in assuming that no defeaters apply. I distinguish seven
sources of justified grounds and state the conditions under which each source is
trustworthy. Adequate grounds include all good relevant information practically
obtainable by the reasoner. The claim must follow from the grounds in accordance
with a justified general warrant. If this warrant is not universal, the reasoner must be
justified in assuming that no exception- 
making circumstances hold in the particular case to which it is applied.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Stephen Toulmin (1958, 2003) advanced his model for the layout of
arguments without providing criteria for evaluating arguments so laid
out. Some criteria are given in his co-authored textbook based on this
model (Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1978, 1984). For example, the
authors prescribe (1984, p. 238) eight ‘essential merits’ of arguments:
clarity on the kind of issues the argument is intended to raise, clarity on
the underlying purpose of the argument, grounds relevant to the claim,
grounds sufficient to support the claim, warrant applicable to the case
under discussion, warrant based on solid backing, modality or strength
of the resulting claim made explicit, possible rebuttals or exceptions
well understood. But these conditions are underdeveloped. The
textbook focuses rather on the structure of arguments and on the forms
their components take in different fields.
Toulmin’s model applies not only to arguments, whose authors
address verbalized reasoning to someone else, but also to solo verbal
reasoning, in which reasoners draw conclusions for themselves from
information at their disposal. I shall propose evaluative criteria for such
reasoning. Solo verbal reasoning as I understand it must have some
verbal components (merely thought, spoken aloud, written, signed, etc.)
but can have non-verbal components. For example, its grounds can
include non-verbal perceptual stimuli or non-verbal symbolic artefacts
such as figures and drawings. In what follows, I shall use the
unqualified term ‘reasoning’ as a convenient abbreviation for ‘solo
verbal reasoning’ as just defined.  I shall assume that the Toulmin
model and its components (claim, grounds, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal,
backing) are known, and shall propose criteria for good reasoning in
terms of the components of this model. I shall use ‘conclusion’ as a
synonym of ‘claim’ and ‘premisses’ as a synonym of ‘data’ or
‘grounds’; the latter usage reflects my position (Hitchcock, 2003) that
the warrant of an inference is not a premiss but an inference-license. I
shall not discuss solo non-verbal reasoning.
Goodness of a kind is relative to function. A good eye is one
that has characteristics that are sufficient for seeing well. A good bread
knife is one that has characteristics that are sufficient for cutting bread
well. Similarly, good reasoning is reasoning that has characteristics that
are sufficient for accomplishing well the function of the reasoning.
Reasoning in fact has many functions, for each of which there will be a
correlative account of its goodness. I shall focus on one common
function: to produce a correct answer to a question whose answer is not
immediately obvious to the reasoner but may be inferred from
information at the reasoner’s disposal. Why did the aeroplane hijackers
who attacked the World Trade Centre choose September 11 as the date
of their attack? What possible difficulties do I need to be aware of
before starting to install a central vacuum system in my house? How
long will it take to get to a place I plan to go to tomorrow? What is the
best way of handling my two-year-old’s temper tantrums? Sometimes
the answers to such questions are obvious, but when they are not, and
we have or can get information from which to work out an answer,
reasoning is appropriate. Naturally we want to arrive through this
reasoning at a correct answer.
There is of course no litmus test or gold standard for correctness
of conclusions. We cannot write the conclusion on a piece of paper, dip
it in a liquid, and determine from the colour of the paper whether the
conclusion is correct or incorrect. We are not infallible visionaries, but
human beings, working with incomplete information of imperfect
quality. Instead of correctness, we must make do with the second best:
justification by the best practically obtainable evidence. That is why
many warrants hold in most or some cases rather than in all cases, why
we qualify our conclusions with such words as ‘probably’ or ‘possibly’,
and why we acknowledge potential defeaters of our conclusions.
Our goal, then, is to reach the answer that the best relevant
practically obtainable evidence justifies us in accepting. I propose four
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for reasoning
that reaches this goal. First, we must be justified in accepting the
ultimate grounds on which we base our reasoning. Second, our grounds
must include all the relevant justified practically obtainable
information. Third, the conclusion must follow in virtue of a justified
warrant. Fourth, if the warrant is not universal, we must be justified in
assuming that in the particular case there are no defeaters that rule out
application of the warrant. I propose these conditions for reasoners to
apply to their own reasoning, thus abstracting from the consideration of
the audience and of the dialogical context that is required in the case of
reasoning verbalized to others. Let us now consider each condition in
detail.
 
1. JUSTIFIED GROUNDS
 It is perhaps self-evident that good reasoning with a function of
arriving at a previously unknown correct answer to a governing
question must start from grounds that we are justified in accepting.
Correct conclusions can follow from incorrect premisses, but it is an
accident if they turn out to be correct. To have some assurance of
reaching our goal, we need justification for our starting-points.
The most trustworthy sources of justified premisses appear to
be direct observation, written records of direct observation, memory of
what one has previously observed or experienced, personal testimony,
previous good reasoning or argument, expert opinion, and appeal to an
authoritative reference source. This list is open to emendation; further,
none of these sources is infallible.
 
1.1. Direct observation
 
In general, the most basic source of justified premisses is direct
observation. Seeing the thick black clouds getting ever larger in the
western sky is good justification for believing that thick black clouds
are forming in the western sky. Hearing the screaming of one’s two-
year-old rapidly diminish in loudness after he is put into his room alone
is good justification for believing that the temper tantrum faded away
after he was put in his room alone. The smell of smoke is good
justification for believing that there is smoke in the air one is breathing
in. Observation includes not only such witnessing by the human senses
but also the reception of information by some sensory apparatus like a
telescope; observation has been defined (Shapere, 1982) as reception
by an appropriate receptor of information transmitted without
interference from the observed entity. In general, an observation is
justified to the extent that the following eight conditions are met:
1.1.1) Well-established background theories show that the receptor in
the observational situation accurately receives information from the
source under normal conditions.
1.1.2) The sense or sensory apparatus being used is in good condition
and functioning properly.
1.1.3) The conditions for observation are adequate.
1.1.4) The information received is of a sort that the receptor generally
detects accurately.
1.1.5) The observer takes care to notice accurately.
1.1.6) The observer, if human, is primed to observe accurately.
1.1.7) The observer has whatever expert knowledge is required to use
any instruments involved and to interpret what is observed.
1.1.8) No other justified information contradicts the observation.
The conditions just mentioned synthesize similar lists proposed by
Robert Ennis (1962, p. 90) and by Stephen Norris (1984) with the
findings of psychological research (Loftus, 1979; Loftus and Doyle,
1992) and work in the philosophy of science (Shapere, 1982; Kosso,
1992). They are only a rough guide, and must be applied to particular
cases with judgement. They exclude a foundationalist account,
according to which observation sometimes provides indubitable
starting- 
points for the construction of human knowledge. In fact, things
formerly taken to be observed can later be discounted as due to defects
in sensory equipment or to mistakes in some theory used to interpret
the equipment’s output. Here, as elsewhere, what is justified may be
false.
 
1.2. Written records of direct observation
 
Written records of direct observation make it possible to restore
previous observations without depending on the vagaries of memory.
They are important where the content of observations must be available
and accurate long after the observation is made, such as in scientific
research, police investigation and medical examination. Norris (1984,
p. 136) proposes the following criteria:
1.2.1) The observation should be reported no more precisely than can
be justified by the observational technique that was used.
1.2.2) The record should be made close to the time of observing.
1.2.3) The record should be made by the observer.
1.2.4) The record should be made in the same environment in which
the observation was made.
 
1.3. Memory
 
Our memory of what we have previously observed or experienced is
basically accurate, or we would not cope as well as we do. But
distortions and failures occur not only at the initial acquisition stage
(the observation) and at the later retrieval stage, but also during the
intervening retention stage–human memory is plastic (Loftus, 1979).
Empirical psychological research has discovered three main sources of
distortion in what we remember (Schacter, 2001): (1) Misattribution
assigns what is remembered to the wrong source, even to reality rather
than fantasy. (2) Our suggestibility leads to the implantation of false
information by leading questions, suggestions or comments at the time
of retrieval. (3) Bias inclines us to edit our remembered past in the light
of our current beliefs.
In general, the recollection of a previous observation or
experience is justified to the extent that the following seven conditions
are met:
1.3.1) The previous observation was justified.
1.3.2) Not much time has elapsed since the previous observation or
experience (Loftus, 1979, pp. 53-54; Schacter, 1995, pp. 25-26).
1.3.3) The recollector has not received subsequent information
(especially misinformation) about the observed episode or objects
(Loftus, 1979, pp. 54-78; Loftus and Doyle, 1992, pp. 61-66, 68-70).
1.3.4) The recollector has not subsequently thought about the observed
episode or objects. Labelling, guessing what was observed, or
verbalizing the recollection can distort (Loftus, 1979, pp. 78-87).
1.3.5) The information recalled consists of emotionally salient and
central facts rather than peripheral or unimportant details (Schacter,
1995, p. 16).
1.3.6) The information is not recalled in response to a leading question
or under hypnosis (Schacter, 1995).
1.3.7) The retrieval environment is the same as that in which the
original observation was made (Loftus, 1979, pp. 88-99).
 
1.4. Personal testimony
 
Personal testimony of what has been directly observed or experienced
must be scrutinized in terms of the criteria for justified observation,
written records, and memory (Ennis, 1962, p. 90; Norris, 1979, pp. 18-
20; 1984, p. 137). For example, testimony based on distant memories is
suspect if unsupported by written records made at or near the time of
the observation.
It is particularly important in evaluating testimony to be on
guard against secondhand, thirdhand, or more distant testimony. As the
game of ‘telephone’ dramatically shows, the quality of messages
passed from one person to another tends to deteriorate with each
transmission. One must also watch for distortion through a careless or
intentionally deceptive formulation.
 
1.5. Previous reasoning or argument
 
The reasoner may already have reached a relevant conclusion by
previous reasoning. Alternatively, the reasoner may have been
convinced by someone else’s argument to accept a relevant conclusion
of that argument. If the relevant conclusion was justified by the earlier
reasoning or argument, it becomes a justified premiss of the new
reasoning.
 
1.6. Expert opinion
 
Reasoners sometimes can and should scrutinize the reasoning by which
an expert arrives at an expert opinion. Sometimes, however, the
reasoner must judge its acceptability indirectly. In such cases, an expert
opinion justifies a claim to the extent that the opinion meets each of the
following seven conditions (cf. Ennis, 1962, pp. 196-197):
1.6.1) The opinion in question must belong to some subject matter in
which there is expertise. An opinion can belong to an area of expertise
even if the expertise is not based on formal education; there are experts
on baseball and on stamps, for example.
1.6.2) The author of the opinion must have the relevant expertise. It is
important to be on guard against the fallacy of ‘expert fixation’,
accepting someone’s opinion because that person is an expert, when the
expertise is irrelevant to the opinion expressed.
1.6.3) The author must use the expertise in arriving at the opinion. The
relevant data must have been collected, interpreted, and processed
using professional knowledge and skills.
1.6.4) The author must exercise care in applying the expertise and in
formulating the expert opinion.
1.6.5) The author ideally should not have a conflict of interest that
could influence, consciously or unconsciously, the formulated opinion.
For example, the acceptance of gifts from the sales representative of a
pharmaceutical company can make a physician’s prescription of that
company’s drug more suspect.
1.6.6) The opinion should not conflict with the opinion of other
qualified experts. If experts disagree, further probing is required.
1.6.7)  The opinion should not conflict with other justified information.
If an expert opinion does not fit with what the reasoner otherwise
knows, one should scrutinize its credentials carefully and perhaps get a
second opinion.
Sometimes we do not know directly whether these seven
conditions are met, and we must judge by inference. The track record
of an expert in the relevant field of expertise is good evidence, positive
or negative, about the trustworthiness of that expert’s new opinion.
 
1.7. Authoritative reference source
 
A seventh source is an authoritative reference source, such as an
encyclopedia or the Handbook of Chemistry and Physics. Authoritative
reference sources differ from expert opinions in that they contain
generic information, whereas expert opinions apply expertise to a
particular situation. Ideally, authoritative references embody the best
available evidence at the time they are composed.
 
1.8. General remarks
 Being justified is not the same as being correct. A premiss justified by
direct observation, or by a written record of a direct observation, or by
an authoritative reference source, may later turn out to be false. The
friend one ‘sees’ across the road may turn out on closer inspection to be
someone else who looks like one’s friend. An entry in a reputable
encyclopedia, general or specialized, can be superseded by subsequent
research or world events. One should always be prepared to revise
one’s belief in light of compelling new evidence to the contrary.
 
2. ADEQUATE INFORMATION
 
If one is  trying to answer a question correctly on the basis of
obtainable information, one needs to take into account all the good
relevant information that is practically obtainable.
The information must be good, in terms of the conditions
previously mentioned for justified premisses. There is no point in
taking bad information into account, still less in devoting time and
effort to acquiring it.
It must be relevant, in the sense that it could make a difference
to the answer one reaches. That is, a justified warrant links it, perhaps
in combination with other already obtained information, to an answer
to the question that could be different than the one justified by the
information already obtained. In many types of inquiry, different pieces
of information point to different answers to a given question; examples
are medical diagnosis, police investigation, military and other
intelligence work, scientific research, adjudication, consumer choice,
and interpretation of such symbolic artefacts as written texts or works
of art or musical compositions. Hence, if in such a context one
considers only information that supports one answer, and ignores
information that points to a different answer, one is more likely to
reach an incorrect conclusion than if one considers everything. A
common human failing is to close prematurely on a particular answer,
then seek supporting evidence for this answer, while failing to seek (or
even ignoring) evidence that points in a different direction. Indeed,
high school English teachers often teach their students to write essays
this way: Adopt a thesis, then assemble evidence to support it. This is a
fallacy of empirical investigation known to psychologists as
‘confirmation bias’ (Klayman, 1995). Both experimental-critical and
historical-textual empirical investigators of human reasoning have
concluded that the most common flaw of informal reasoning is the
failure to consider lines of argument supporting conclusions contrary to
the one reached (Finocchiaro, 1994). The mass media occasionally
report examples of such failures in detective and intelligence work:
convictions for murder are sometimes reversed on the basis of DNA
evidence, and intelligence estimates of a foreign country’s military
preparations sometimes prove wildly inaccurate. Confirmation bias
occurs in a subtle way in the publication in scientific journals of
experimental results that are tested for their statistical significance.
Since the best journals are distinguished by the strictness of their
criterion, accepting only results that are significant at the .01 level (as
opposed to the .05 level or .10 elsewhere), the evidence published in
the best journals can be a biased sample of the evidence actually
obtained by researchers.
Relevance is a function of context. Suppose the question is
whether all swans are white. We have a justified assumption, well
supported by direct and reported observation of birds of both sexes in
many species, that birds of a single sex in a single species have uniform
colouring; for example, all male cardinals have the same bright red
colouring. Suppose that we are aware of observations of swans of both
sexes in each of many species: mute swans, trumpeter swans, whistling
swans, and whooper swans. Suppose that all observed swans of these
species were seen to be white. Then observing more swans of any one
of those species, of either sex, is irrelevant; we have strong reason to
believe that no such additional observation will produce a different
answer to our question. But then we hear reports that there are different
species of swans in the southern hemisphere. Observing swans of those
species is relevant. Once we become aware of observations of the
‘black swans’ of Australia and New Zealand, which are as black as
their name implies, then no further observations of swans is relevant;
we have conclusive proof in the last observations of a negative answer
to our question: not all swans are white. In general, if the justified
premisses at one’s disposal support an answer to one’s question that no
additional evidence can overturn, then no such further additional
evidence is relevant. Of course, if further information casts doubt on
one or more of those justified premisses, then the situation can change.
Finally, one needs to take into account only practically
obtainable information. The word ‘practically’ implies multiple
relativity: to the time and effort required to obtain the information, to
the importance that one answer the question correctly, and to the
urgency of arriving at an answer. If it will take a two-minute Internet
search to get relevant information of good quality, and one has the two
minutes to spare, and it is important that the answer be correct, and one
can wait two minutes before closing in on an answer, then one ought to
do the Internet search. If the question is whether to quarantine a patient
with symptoms like those of sudden acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), a contagious viral infection with a 15% mortality rate, and it
takes a week to get the result of a ‘gold standard’ test of the patient’s
blood sample, then one quarantines the patient first (unless one can
immediately exclude a diagnosis of SARS) and reviews the quarantine
decision after receiving the result of the blood test. There is of course
no general algorithm for balancing considerations of time, effort,
urgency and importance of correctness in deciding whether it is
practical to obtain a certain piece of good relevant information.
Judgement is required.
 
3. JUSTIFIED APPLICABLE WARRANT
 
If one’s reasoning is to justify one’s conclusion, that conclusion must
follow from one’s premisses in accordance with a justified general
warrant.
The phrase ‘in accordance with’ means that the warrant actually
applies to the inference. In other words, the warrant is semantically
equivalent to some generalization of the reasoning’s associated
conditional ‘if p1 and ... and pn , then c’, where p1, ..., pn stand for the
premisses and c for the conclusion (with qualifiers and defeaters
removed).  The requirement that the warrant actually apply to the
inference is self-evident; obviously the warrant that argon is an inert
gas has nothing to do with the quality of an inference from the speed
clocked on a radar device to the conclusion that the car was speeding.
A subtle danger in reasoning, which reasoners may not notice, is the
use of a generalization of the converse of the associated conditional.
For example, one may reason from hearing a train-like whistle that a
train is in the vicinity. Reflecting on why one thinks this follows, one
might propose the generalized warrant: If a train is in the vicinity, then
I hear a whistle like the one I just heard. But this is the converse of the
required warrant, which is rather: If I hear a whistle like the one I just
heard, then a train is in the vicinity. This warrant may not be justified;
for example, one may be aware that there are no train tracks in one’s
vicinity, and that one’s neighbour is a train afficionado who habitually
plays recordings of trains at high volume.1
In addition to being applicable, the warrant must be general. No
conclusion follows in just one particular case; if it follows in one case,
it follows in parallel cases. An applicable warrant picks out a class of
such cases. It is important to realize that there may be several ways of
doing so. In general, warrants generalize over the repeated content
expressions of one’s reasoning, and they must generalize over at least
one content expression that occurs both in a premiss and in the
conclusion (Hitchcock, 1985). If more than one content expression is
repeated, then the reasoning has several potential warrants for the
inference. Furthermore, the extent to which one generalizes over a
given content expression is variable. In the whistle example,
generalizing over the implicit time constant ‘now’ to all times produces
the warrant: Whenever I hear a whistle here that sounds like this, a
train is in the vicinity. Generalizing to a given time of day produces the
warrant: Whenever at about 7 p.m. I hear a whistle here that sounds
like this, a train is in the vicinity. Generalizing to a given time interval
like the calendar year produces the warrant: Whenever in the current
calendar year I hear a whistle here that sounds like this, a train is in the
vicinity. And so on.
The requirement that the warrant be general is not a
requirement that it be universal. Warrants, as Toulmin pointed out, can
be modally qualified, as holding for the most part, or ceteris paribus, or
even just sometimes. Such qualifications, along with qualifications of
the epistemic status of the warrant, imply imperfect support for  the
conclusion, which may or may not be explicitly marked in one’s
reasoning.
Finally, the warrant must be justified. It is neither necessary nor
sufficient that the warrant actually hold, i.e. that the generalization is
correct (whether universally, for the most part, ceteris paribus, or just
sometimes). Correctness is not sufficient, because reasoners need to
draw inferences in accordance with warrants of which they are actually
aware. Thus, for example, a logic student in the 1920s who was
thinking about axiomatized Peano arithmetic could not use the correct
generalization that no consistent axiomatization of arithmetic is
complete to draw the conclusion that axiomatized Peano arithmetic is
incomplete, because this generalization had not yet been shown to be
true. Nor is correctness necessary. Fallible human reasoners with
limited resources have no direct access to truth, or more broadly to
correctness. They must make do with what at any given time they are
justified in accepting. Hence good reasoners must be ready to revise
their cognitive commitments, including the warrants in accordance with
which they reason, in the light of new good evidence.
In Toulmin’s model, warrants are justified by backing. His
conception of backing, and his distinction between warrant-using and
warrant-establishing arguments, is linked to his strong field- 
dependency thesis, about which many reservations have been
expressed, for example in several chapters of Norris (1992). In fact,
there seems no reason to postulate a sharp difference in kind between
warrant-using reasoning and warrant-establishing reasoning. If one is
reasoning to a conclusion that will later serve as a warrant for further
reasoning, the conclusion is one’s claim and the ‘backing’ for that
claim constitutes one’s grounds; the inference from grounds to claim
will have its own warrant. In good medical reasoning, for example,
conclusions about individual patients are reached using so-called
‘evidence-based’ generalizations about risk factors, diagnosis,
prognosis or  treatment. The evidence that justifies such generalizations
tends to take the form of clinical trials and other analytical studies, the
conclusions from which are incorporated through meta-analysis and
systematic review into authoritative clinical guidelines and references.
Reasoning from the results synthesized in a systematic review to a
clinical guideline is, in Toulmin’s terminology, another instance of
reasoning from grounds to a claim, only at a higher level than
reasoning that applies a clinical guideline to the observed
circumstances of a particular patient.
 
4. JUSTIFIED IN ASSUMING THAT NO DEFEATERS APPLY
 
A well-known feature of Toulmin’s model is that many warrants come
with rebuttals, or exceptional conditions under which the conclusion is
incorrect. If the warrant that justifies one’s inference is not universal,
one must be justified in assuming that no exceptional condition in the
particular case rules out application of the warrant. Such exceptional
circumstances include not only circumstances that show that the
conclusion is incorrect but also circumstances that show that the
warrant is inapplicable to a particular situation, even though the
conclusion may be correct. There may be other types of defeaters. The
type of exceptional circumstance that shows the conclusion to be
incorrect may be said to override (Pinto, 1999) or rebut (Pollock, 1970)
the warrant; a standard example is the circumstance that a bird is a
penguin, which overrides the warrant that birds fly (since penguins do
not fly). The type of exceptional circumstance that shows the warrant
to be inapplicable even though the conclusion may nevertheless be
correct, may be said to undermine (Pinto, 1999) or undercut (Pollock,
1970) the warrant; a standard example due to Pollock (1995) is the
undermining of the warrant that things that look red are red by the
circumstance that the object one is looking at is illuminated by a red
light. If one is not justified in assuming that a warrant lacks defeaters in
a particular case, then one’s conclusion about that case is obviously
unjustified.
The condition that one is justified in assuming that no defeaters
apply is weaker than the condition that one has a justification or proof
that no defeaters apply. To require a reasoner using a non-universal
warrant to have a justification that no defeaters apply is to impose too
great a burden of proof. The non-existence of a defeater is not a ground
from which the reasoner arrives at a given conclusion. Rather, defeaters
are something to be aware of as a possibility. In many cases, there are
indefinitely many possible defeaters, and it would paralyse reasoning to
require a reasoner to have a justification for excluding each and every
one of them.
What does it take to be justified in assuming that no exception
to a warrant applies to the particular case about which one is
reasoning? First, one must know of no such exception. Second, if an
exceptional condition has serious consequences and one can find out
without too much difficulty whether it is present in the particular case,
one must find out whether the exceptional condition is present. For
example, in general it is safe to start across an intersection when the
light turns green. But it is dangerous to do so if a vehicle on the cross
street is running a red light. Since it takes only a brief look in each
direction to determine if this exceptional condition is present, an
appropriately careful driver will look in each direction as the light turns
green, to make sure that no vehicle is going to run the newly red light
on the cross street. The example is a bit artificial, since the behaviour
of experienced drivers in such routine situations is a matter of habit, but
reasoning can be used in forming such habits, for example, when one is
receiving driving instruction. The more serious the consequences of an
exception, the more effort one should be prepared to put into finding
out if it is present. It is a matter of judgement where to draw the line.
Third, if the previous two conditions have been met, one can draw
one’s conclusion as if there is no exception, but one should be alert to
the possibility of discovering at a later time some exceptional
circumstance pertaining to the particular case. If one’s observation of a
clock leads one to conclude that the time is 10:15, and shortly after
making that observation one sees another clock which reads 11:20, then
one should suspend judgement about what time it is until one finds out
which of the two clocks is correct.
 
SUMMARY
 
The four conditions—justified premisses, adequate information,
justified applicable warrant, justified assumption that no exceptions
apply—are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for good solo
reasoning aimed at working out a correct answer to a question.
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1A generalization of the converse may be said to warrant an abductive
inference to a possible explanatory hypothesis, in this case that there may be a train in
the vicinity. But the generalization of the converse seems to be backing for the
warrant, rather than the warrant itself. The qualified warrant is: whenever someone
hears a whistle like the one I heard, it may be produced by a nearby train. Its backing
is: If the driver blows the whistle of a nearby train, it makes a sound like the sound I
just heard.
